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UNEQUAL PROMISES
Aditi Bagchi*
This essay explores the nature and implications of a type of inequality that is
widespread, but largely ignored. Promises deliver important ethical value, and
commercial promises, because they are our most common experience of promise with
strangers, are of special value; but not all commercial promises generate that value
equally. This paper makes the following claims: (1) while some retail promises are
promises either to deliver a good or service, or to pay some compensation, other
retail promises are simple promises to deliver a good or service; (2) retail promises
in high-end markets are more likely to have the simple form, while retail promises
in low-end markets are more likely to be conditional; (3) bifurcated promises that
create less certainty and less entitlement are inferior to simple promises to deliver a
good or service; and (4) inequality in the quality of retail promise has implications
for how members from different social backgrounds relate to others in their political
and economic community.
Most legally enforceable promises between strangers take place in the
commercial arena. While the promises that mean the most to us often take
place within private relationships, most of the promises we make and receive
occur in our transitory relations with people we do not know and with whom
we are transacting for circumscribed purposes. Although retail promises may
seem less important than those of a more personal nature, the totality of these
impersonal promises are as, if not more important to our experience of the
institution of promise as are those that arise out of personal relationships.
In this paper, I explore one consequence of the fact that we experience
promise primarily in the marketplace: we do not all experience promise in the
same way. In fact, the practice of promising is systematically segmented by
purchasing power. Not all promises are equal, and individuals will tend to
repeatedly experience promise of the inferior or superior variety.
How do promises vary? Clearly, they vary along multiple dimensions, but
the systematic difference between “high” and “low-quality” promises that
concerns us here is the degree to which a promise (1) creates certainty for its
promisee, and (2) creates an obligation in the promisor that may require it to
modify its course of conduct for the benefit of the promisee. Whatever other
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values are served by the practice—and no doubt there are several—the ability
to form expectations and plan for the future, and the related sense of control
over one’s own life, is one of the primary values created by promise,
especially contractual promises between strangers. Promises also create in
promisees a reason for, or even a partial authority over, their promisors in a
way that is rare among strangers and also potentially important for promisees’
sense of agency.
Several authors have noted that the value of the promise lies in the
relationship it enables between promisors and promises.  But the value of the1
relationship between consumers and the retailers that promise them goods or
services is not obvious. Daniel Markovits and Dori Kimel have both explained
the value of contractual relations with reference to their arms-length nature.2
Consistent with both accounts is a recognition of the value to contracting
parties of being able to form expectations about the way in which others will
deal in contract, how to plan with whom one will deal, and in what way.3
Contract is a mechanism of control, not just over others, but more importantly,
over one’s own life. This control is important because our lives are
intertwined and dependent on the conduct of strangers. One of the reasons the
value of contractual promise to consumers differs from the value of ordinary
promises, is because consumers have different reasons to value the ability to
plan the course of dealings with retailers than they do for valuing certainty in
relations with friends and family.
The importance of a promise to the relationship between a commercial
promisor and promisee may also have to do with the value to the promisee of
having a claim on the promisor, and on the value of presenting a reason that
the promisor must do something that she otherwise would not. Most
obligations that individuals have toward people they do not know are
obligations that they have toward everyone. For example, the obligation to
drive carefully so as to avoid injuring others reflects a duty toward many
discrete persons simultaneously. No single person is a but-for reason to drive
carefully. Even less general obligations, if they are involuntary, are usually
toward all those with whom one deals in a certain way—e.g., all the
1. See, e.g., DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF
CONTRACT (2003); Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004); Joseph
Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916 (1982).
2. KIMEL, supra note 1, at 28–31; Daniel Markovits, Solidarity at Arm’s Length, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ilp/2008papers/MarkovitsSolidarityatArmsLength.pdf.
3. Cf. TIM SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 304 (1998) (locating the value of promising
in the value of assurance).
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passengers in one’s boat, all the patients that one treats, or all the students that
one teaches.
The scope of obligation in these contexts is usually determined by the
range of characteristics likely to be present in a group of passengers, patients,
or students. While damages in the event of a breach in our duty toward these
potential victims will depend on the unique characteristics of the unlucky
person who is injured, what we are obligated to do in the first place does not
similarly turn on the individual circumstances of any single person to whom
our duty is owed. Our most unique obligations may be toward friends and
family, but among strangers, contractual promises create the most tailored
obligations. Some—but not all—retail contracts, even standard form contracts,
create an obligation on the part of promisors to do things for particular
promisees in the event certain contingencies arise.
Contractual promises differ in the extent to which they serve either or
both of these values. First, contractual promises differ in their ability to
deliver certainty with respect to the course of contract. One basic way in
which contracts differ in this way is that some contractual promises do not
obligate a promisor to perform in a determinate way, but rather provide
promisors with options as to how they might fulfill their contractual
obligation. For example, a promise might obligate a promisor either to deliver
a specific good or to compensate the promisee. Performance of other
contractual promises might not have this bifurcated structure; performance
might entail delivery of the good. Any compensation delivered under the latter
contracts is remedial.
Relatedly, contractual promises differ in whether the promisor may have
to undertake some performance that deviates from its ordinary course of
conduct. Retail contracts that allow promisors either to deliver a good or
compensate the promisee will not usually require the promisor to undertake
tailored performance beyond issuance of some compensation, which may just
be a fixed refund leaving the promisor as she was before ever encountering the
promisee. Conversely, simple contractual promises for delivery of a good may
obligate the promisor to go out of its way for the promisee. The promisee (i.e.
promissory obligations to the promisee) may be a reason that the promisor
does something it would not otherwise do.
Most promises to deliver a good or service are not accompanied in
contract by a term providing for specific performance. The result is that, with
some exceptions, contract law does not discriminate between a bifurcated
promise to deliver or pay expectation damages, and a simple promise to
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deliver.  Promisors who breach contracts are liable for expectation damages4
irrespective of whether the underlying contractual promise has a “deliver or
pay” structure. The best justification for calling on the defendant-promisor to
compensate the plaintiff-promisee may be different for each type of promise,
but because the appropriate judicial response in either case may be the award
of monetary damages in the same amount, there may be little cause to separate
them into different species of contract. Many retail contracts will specify the
remedy for breach (again, usually not specific performance), and if, in the
absence of either delivery or payment, breach has been established, in these
cases too, there are few grounds for launching into an inquiry of what kind of
promise was broken. Courts do not fruitfully distinguish between the two
types of retail promise in the course of adjudicating contractual disputes and
awarding remedies to parties who establish that their promisors have delivered
neither conventional performance nor adequate compensation.
Contract law’s relative silence on this distinction has been interpreted in
various ways. Most have not found the law blind to a difference in promissory
structure. Instead, some have argued that contract law fails to recognize that
most, if not all, promises are promises to deliver. By effectively permitting
promisors to breach ordinary contracts and pay expectation damages, contract
law diverges from the ordinary norms of promise, which obligate promisors
to deliver the promised goods or services.  Others have implicitly or explicitly5
argued that contract law simply recognizes that contractual promises just are
promises either to deliver or pay.  As such, a failure to deliver under a contract6
4. I will usually refer to “deliver or pay” contracts rather than “perform or pay” since the question
is precisely whether provision of compensation is also a form of performance. “Simple” promises to deliver
do not give the promisor an option to pay instead.
5. In a widely acclaimed article, Seana Shiffrin has made the provocative but intuitive claim that
contract law diverges from the moral practice of promise. Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and
Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 709 (2007). Perhaps the most fundamental way in which the two diverge,
in her view, is that contract law traditionally limits damages for breach of contract to plaintiff’s expectation.
Id. at 723. Neither specific performance nor punitive damages are normally available. Id. The law thus fails
to condemn breach; indeed, it encourages it, inasmuch as the expectation damage award is defended in part
because it motivates efficient breach. Shiffrin argues that this feature of contract law may not adequately
accommodate the moral obligation to perform one’s promise. Id. at 719. While contract law need not simply
reflect or enforce moral obligation, in a liberal regime, the law should facilitate individuals’ ethical
flourishing, not pose obstacles and generally cramp our pursuit of a moral life. Id. By refusing to condemn
breach, and by virtue of scholarly rhetoric that justifies the expectation remedy by way of the theory of
efficient breach, the law indirectly encourages behavior that morality would discourage. Id. at 732–33, 740.
In this way, Shiffrin argues, it makes more burdensome and indeed less likely, the moral choice to perform
one’s promises in the context of contract. Id.
6. See Avery Weiner Katz, The Option Element in Contracting, 90 VA. L. REV. 2187, 2188 (2004)
(“[I]t has long been recognized that a contract that is enforceable only through monetary liability operates
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is not a breach of either the contract or the underlying promise. If almost all
promises are really promises to deliver or pay, then the law adequately
distinguishes the two types of promises just by treating differently those few
cases in which a contract provides for specific performance as the remedy.
On both these views, whether contracts are “deliver or pay” is mostly
treated categorically. Contract law either misperceives the nature of
contractual promise, or it accurately captures contractual promise. Either most
contractual promises are “deliver or pay,” or hardly any are. There is little
attention to a potentially basic fracture in the nature of contractual promise.
Even those who acknowledge that not all contracts need to take the same form
have directed their argument toward identifying the form that most contracts
take, rather than explaining how we might discern which form any given
contract takes.7
Both of the dominant views purport to trace their picture of contractual
promise to contractual intent. The view that contracts offer parties a morally
neutral choice to perform or pay stems from the availability of expectation
damages, which are the default remedy in most contracts not for land. Since
parties know in advance that expectation damages are the default rule, their
failure to specify some alternative remedy suggests that they intend their
contract to permit promisors either to deliver or pay. The generally opposing
view holds that most promisees expect promisors to deliver and that promisors
are aware of that fact. Indeed, a consumer-promisee would not enter into a
retail contract unless she believed it would result in delivery of a good or
service; the practice depends on delivery as the usual course of performance
because parties would not otherwise be motivated to contract.
Each of these accounts of contractual intent and its relation to the content
of contractual promise fails to give one type of retail promise its due. On the
one hand, even if parties are aware of a legal default providing for expectation
damages in the event of breach, they might intend to undertake more rigorous
in practice as an option, because as a legal matter the promisor retains the power either to perform or to
breach and pay damages.”); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
139, 139 (1995) (“The ability to breach and pay money damages is analogous to granting the breaching
party an option to buy back his performance for a strike price equal to the damages award.”); Anthony T.
Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978) (characterizing damages for breach of
contract as “liability rule” protection for contractual entitlements); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific
Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (same). See also Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded
Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428 (2004); IAN
AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005).
7. Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1561 (2009).
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obligations, but not intend to make them contractually enforceable.  While8
admittedly not central to the fundamental question of what damages should be
available, commercial parties may make promises to each other that are not
the equivalent of the legal obligations they assume. On the other hand, the
argument that parties almost always intend to promise delivery rather than an
option to deliver or pay conflates parties’ intentions regarding the obligations
they assume with their expectations as to what will occur. Parties surely enter
into contracts expecting that actual delivery is likely, if not almost certain. But
that may reflect their belief that the promisor will probably be motivated to
deliver rather than pay, not their intention to impose an obligation on the
promisor to deliver irrespective of a wide range of improbable events.
I argue here that both types of promise are well-represented in the
marketplace. Commitments for simple delivery are expensive and affordable
for only some promisees. I further argue that not just the goods and services
to which a promise is connected, but also the “deliver or pay” promise itself
is inferior in certain respects, and that the result is an abiding inequality in the
experience of promise with strangers. Because promise is an institution of
greater ethical import than many goods and services available on the market,
inequality in promise is of special consequence. In the final part of this paper,
I begin to explore those consequences.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I will show that retail contracts
sometimes entail promises to deliver a specified good or service, and that any
compensation for breach of those promises is remedial. However, the
promises underlying other retail contracts have a deliver or pay structure, and
failure to perform in a conventional sense does not entail breach of a moral
duty created by promise. In Part II, I will argue that this difference is best
understood as a difference in the quality of promise. Last, in Part III, I will
discuss the significance of this inequality of retail promise in a political-
economic community.
I. THE HETEROGENEITY OF RETAIL PROMISES AND
CONTRACTUAL COMMUNITIES
Contract scholars disagree as to whether most commercial contracts can
appropriately be understood as promises either to deliver a good or service, or
to pay for the failure to do so. If a contract entails such a bifurcated promise,
8. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 404
(1990) (detailing reasons sellers may have for not making quality commitments legally enforceable).
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expectation damages are not a remedy for breach of a duty; they represent one
option available to contracting parties. Damages do not compensate for a
wrong but create a choice for promisors.  On this view, the principle of9
efficient breach and its widely-acknowledged role in justifying the expectation
remedy may go further than simply allowing payment instead of performance;
it may invite it.  Moreover, on this view, contract rules track underlying10
moral obligations because promisors never promised to do anything other than
either to deliver or to pay.11
On an alternative view, it is inconsistent with common sense to construe
ordinary purchases in this manner. Upon ordering an item of furniture, one
receives not a promise either to deliver the furniture or pay any particular
amount, but a simple promise of furniture. Performance of that promise may
be excused on various grounds, and sometimes the obligation to deliver will
give way to an obligation to pay some amount of damages, but the initial
promise does not place delivery of the furniture on a par with any monetary
payment; rather, any compensation paid upon failure to deliver is remedial.12
The entire exercise in contract, after all, is motivated by a desire to obtain
some furniture, not its monetary equivalent.  The institution of contract13
requires that most promisors deliver their good or service rather than
compensate in the usual case.14
Neither picture perfectly captures the retail promise generally. This is
because retail promises, as a subclass of promises, vary considerably and,
while in some consumer markets they are indeed of a deliver or pay form, in
higher end consumer markets they are not. No single characterization of retail
9. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 235–36 (Transaction Publishers 2005)
(1881) (“The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor
pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass.”); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE 191–92 (2002); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
462 (1897) (“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages
if you do not keep it—and nothing else.”); Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (2009) (“The promise is to perform or to pay damages, and so if you choose
not to perform—even if you are prevented from performing by circumstances beyond your control—you
must pay damages.”).
10. Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 732 (describing the view).
11. Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 440 (2006) (“Performance
is morally required in a contingency if and only if the parties did specify, or would have specified,
performance in that particular contingency.”).
12. Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1989) (“[T]he
weakness of Holmes’s approach lies in its conclusion that the remedy provides a perfect substitute for the
right, when in truth the purpose of the remedy is to vindicate that right, not to replace it.”).
13. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 1565.
14. Id. at 1566.
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contract is uniformly applicable. In this Part, I argue that (1) whether a
contractual promise should be understood as deliver or pay depends on the
understanding of the parties; (2) due to the centrality of intention to the
content of promise, well-publicized practices in connection with retail
promises are self-justifying; and (3) because prevailing practice differs at the
high and low ends of a retail market, the substance of retail promises differs
systematically as well.
A. Whether a Promise Is to Deliver or Pay, or Only to Deliver Depends on
the Understanding of the Parties
Promises are quintessentially voluntary commitments. They do not
exhaust the field of voluntary obligation, but they have been especially
puzzling precisely because it has been difficult to explain how the bare
communication of an intention to assume an obligation could bring that
obligation into reality.15
The voluntariness of promise, and contractual promise in particular, is so
deeply entrenched as a normative matter that contract scholars have been more
concerned with debunking any exaggeration of the point.  While a promise16
may be essentially voluntary, not all aspects of the practice are voluntary. We
are obligated beyond that to which we specifically commit, and there are
exceptional cases where we may be treated as having made a promise that we
never intended to make, especially in a contractual context.  Ultimately, “the17
voluntariness of obligations is a matter of degree inasmuch as the awareness
of the precise content of the obligation undertaken and the ease with which the
obligating behavior can be avoided are matters of degree.”  Similarly, the18
voluntariness of promissory obligation will depend on the extent to which a
promisor is fully aware of the normative implications of her promise and her
15. My discussion here focuses on promise, but the voluntary character of promise underwrites the
voluntary nature of contract. See Raz, supra note 1, at 938 (“The distinctive mark of contract law is that
the harms it protects against are harms to the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations and harms
resulting from its abuse.”).
16. See, e.g., Glanville L. Williams, Language and the Law—IV, 61 L.Q. REV. 384, 402–03 (1945)
(“It is common form among judges to deny that they ever read into a contract or other document anything
other than what, in their view, the parties actually intended; and occasionally they have even gone so far
as to say that the implication must be collected from the words of the document itself. These statements
cannot be taken seriously.”).
17. Roy Kreitner, Fear of Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 429, 430 (2004).
18. Raz, supra note 1, at 929.
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ability to avoid making the promise. The latter may depend on the relational,
social, and economic costs of avoiding a given promise.
Sometimes a promisor does not seek to assume some content of her
promissory obligation and that particular obligation arises for reasons
unrelated to her intention to assume it. However, to the extent the obligation
is nevertheless deemed promissory, it is the ultimately voluntary nature of the
overarching promise which justifies imposition of the obligation.  That is, her19
act of promise is a but-for condition of the ancillary obligations that she did
not specifically intend to assume.
Judicial exaggeration of the voluntariness of contract, even in the face of
increased willingness to add terms and otherwise depart from contractual
intent, may have lead some to suggest that voluntariness of the institution of
promising has been overrated as well. Scholars have pointed to the mandatory
character of promissory obligation, the presence of default rules in promise
interpretation, the principle of objectivity, and the impossibility of certain
kinds of promise as evidence of the limits of voluntariness.
Some scholars have suggested that one does not control the scope of
one’s promissory obligations in the context of contract any more than one
does in any other context.  That is, just as having befriended a friend, one20
cannot renounce the obligations of friendship, one also cannot, having
assumed the position of promisor, renounce the obligations of promise. If
contractual obligations belong to a larger set of promissory obligations, one
cannot extract oneself from that moral space simply by declaring, let alone
intending, to relieve oneself of moral obligation. Shiffrin suggests that this
conceptualization of the boundaries of promise may imply that, in a
commercial context, one party may not promise to deliver a product or good,
or otherwise pay—that is, it may rule out interpreting ordinary commercial
promises as deliver-or-pay promises.  This early variant of her argument21
against the deliver-or-pay promise does not work. Whether promises give rise
to a moral obligation to perform may very well be outside the control of the
parties. But this level of involuntariness does not compromise the voluntary
nature of a promise because the content of a promise, i.e., what a promisor
19. Id. at 932.
20. Id.
21. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 1567. In an earlier article, Shiffrin argued that it is implausible to
interpret contracts as promises to either perform or pay because damages are extractable by way of legal
coercion. She maintains that a promise to perform or pay damages upon legal action fails as a promise.
Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 728. However, this argument does not defeat the view that voluntary compensation
is properly regarded as performance of ordinary commercial contracts.
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promises to do, is within her control. Once she assumes the obligation to do
X, she may not specify the normative consequences of her failure to do it;
however, she can refrain from assuming that obligation, or she may assume a
lesser obligation to do X or Y.
Most promisors do rely on background norms to fill out the content of
their promises, since their promises rarely detail implicit conditions.  For22
example, a promise to drop someone off after a party implies a promise to do
so in a sober state, but probably does not imply an obligation to drop off that
person at some unforeseeably remote location. Similarly, the content of a
promise must be interpreted with reference to a promisee’s reasonable
understanding of that promise, even where that understanding is not what the
promisor really intended to impart.  For example, one might promise to help23
someone move, assuming that a moving company has been hired and that one
will only need to help direct the movers. However, if an offer to help move a
friend is, under certain circumstances, reasonably interpreted to entail a
promise to actually move the contents of one apartment to another, then the
promisor is bound by that more onerous commitment.
Both the presence of implicit background terms and the principle of
objectivity demonstrate the boundaries of a voluntary picture of contract, but
neither of these aspects of promising compromises its voluntary character.
With some deliberate effort, one can avoid the assumption of most
background ancillary obligations, as well as most misunderstandings by
promisees. More importantly, both default rules and objectivity in the
institution of promise reflect the need to ascertain the promisor’s intentions
in some way. Without some tools with which to make an assessment, would-
be promisors would be incapacitated qua promisors. Those who seek to
invoke the convention of promise must implicitly endorse those necessary
trappings of the convention that they do not affirmatively avoid.
One might argue that promissory obligation is still more loosely tethered
to voluntary commitment. If the obligation that a promisor chooses to assume
is highly unusual in its structure, it might fall outside of the recognizable
22. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 489, 490 (1989).
23. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 3 (1994) (“A promise demonstrates a party’s intent to act
or not act in a specific way; this demonstration of intent, in turn, justifies the promisee in understanding
that a commitment exists and binds the promisor to the happening of the future promised event.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981) (“A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or
refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment
has been made.”). See also Andrew Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 33–34
(2009).
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practice of promise.  That is, at some point, a promise simply fails as a24
promise and it is not what it purports to be. A promisor is unsuccessful if her
commitment lacks certain features essential to promise as a conventional
practice.
The failed promise is familiar to contract law in the form of the illusory
promise.  In cases failing for lack of mutuality of obligation, one party can25
never be said to have breached.  This is usually because her promise kicks in26
only upon the fulfillment of a condition which she herself controls.27
Mutuality of obligation cases are now usually handled—the lack of mutuality
“cured”—by implying a duty of good faith that removes enough discretion
from the promisor that she cannot be said to control unilaterally the entire
scope of her own obligation; a promisor who disavows even that duty of good
faith fails to enter a legally effective contract.  This convenient trick of28
judicial interpretation merely demonstrates that even contract law itself insists
that a promisor does not get to determine completely what she promises. A
promise that fails to create some minimum, breachable, legal obligation is not
a legally binding promise.
More generally, a promise that fails adequately to commit the promisor,
fails as a promise, irrespective of how the promisor may view that
commitment. If the promisor disavows the moral obligation of promise but
specifically characterizes her obligation as promissory, she has contradicted
herself, and whether the moral obligation associated with promise attaches to
her commitment just depends on which element of her communication
prevails—i.e., which element would be reasonably taken to dominate the
other.
However, these are the outer boundaries of promise, which test the
voluntary aspects of the practice. Within wide bounds, the common
24. See Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 728 (doubting that “the contents of promises are indefinitely plastic
and utterly up to their makers”).
25. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 130 (1994); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77
(1981).
26. See Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 769 (1982) (“[A] route of complete escape vitiates
any other consideration furnished and is incompatible with the existence of a contract.”); 3 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 7:7 (4th ed. 1999) (an illusory promise “would impose no obligation, since the promisor
always has it within his power to keep his promise and yet escape performance of anything detrimental to
himself or beneficial to the promisee”).
27. See supra note 26.
28. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.2d 224, 89 A.L.R. 238
(8th Cir. 1933). Cf. Pacific Pines Const. Corp. v. Young, 477 P.2d 894 (1970) (stating that because there
was no express provision reserving unrestricted right of cancellation, requirement to use best efforts would
be imputed).
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understanding between a promisor and promisee determines what the promisor
will be obligated to do and under what circumstances.  Most retail promises,29
whether characterized as simple promises to deliver or as promises to deliver
or pay, successfully obligate the promisor without contradiction.
The voluntary character of promissory obligation is its distinctive feature.
Similarly, the relatively voluntary character of contractual obligation
continues to distinguish it from tort under the broad umbrella of private legal
obligation. It is now commonplace that neither contractual nor promissory
obligation is completely voluntary.  Just as promises must be construed in the30
light of background norms, contractual obligations are construed with the aid
of default rules. However, the substantive core of contractual obligation arises
only upon voluntary entry into a contract and courts are still loathe to revise
contractual obligation in unpredictable ways.  Similarly, while moral norms31
expand and constrict promissory practices in various ways, an obligation can
only be characterized as promissory to the extent the promisor sought out the
substantive core of that obligation.
In the same way that the parties’ shared understanding is important to
ascertaining the content of contractual obligation, their shared understanding
is essential to understanding the content of the related promise. Thus, whether
the ordinary commercial promise is one to deliver the specified good or
service, or whether it is a merely a promise to deliver or pay some
29. See Geary v. Wentworth Laboratories, Inc., 60 Conn. App. 622, 760 A.2d 969, 972 (2000)
(quoting L & R Realty v. Connecticut Nat’l Bank, 53 Conn. App. 524, 732 A.2d 181) (“To form a valid
and binding contract in Connecticut, there must be a mutual understanding of the terms that are definite
and certain between the parties. . . . To constitute an offer and acceptance sufficient to create an enforceable
contract, each must be found to have been based on an identical understanding by the parties. . . . If the
minds of the parties have not truly met, no enforceable contract exists.”); Blinn v. Beatrice Community
Hosp. and Health Center, Inc., 270 Neb. 809, 824, 708 N.W.2d 235, 248 (2006) (“[A] contract requires that
the promisor intend to make a binding promise—a binding mutual understanding or ‘meeting of the minds’
. . . .”).
30. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 569, 576–77 (1933);
William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L.
REV. 837, 863 (1982); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1265 (1998); Christine Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203 (2002);
Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men’s Consciences and
Women’s Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775, 778 n.15 (1992); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and
Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 113 (1996) (“The requirement to form a contract is not that
parties actually assent to its terms. The requirement is that they take actions . . . .”); see also Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
31. See, e.g., Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete
Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 118–19 (2008)
(discussing courts’ reluctance to revise noncompete clauses in order to render them enforceable).
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compensation, depends on what form commercial retailers intend their
promises to take, and on what their promisees believe them to be promising.
Default rules that we use in interpreting retail promises do not render
them involuntary; they are usually our best guess as to what parties intended.
The principle of objectivity does not imply that the scope of retail promises
does not depend on the understanding of retailer and consumer; rather, it
means that we look to their common understanding rather than the beliefs and
expectations subjectively held by either side. And while some promises may
fail as promises, it is surely within the power of promisors to promise either
simple delivery, or to retain the option of compensation. Some promises fail
as promises because they do not effectively obligate a promisor to do
anything—but that is not the case in a deliver or pay promise. Other promises
may contradict themselves if they at once purport to assume and deny some
obligation. But while a deliver or pay promise denies the obligation to deliver
where it is more profitable to pay some fixed rate of compensation, it is not
an internal contradiction because nothing in the promise purports to assume
that obligation. The practice of promising has involuntary elements and
involuntary boundaries, but ordinary retail promises of both the types that
concern us here fit comfortably within its voluntary core.
B. Well-Known Prevailing Practices Are Self-Justifying
There may have been a time when retail consumers expected consistent
delivery of goods and services from retailers. But that moment has surely
passed. Now, most consumers recognize the risk that many retailers will not
deliver the goods or services contemplated by contract. They are fully aware
that compensation—sometimes substantially below expectation damages,
often contractually specified—is all that they can expect should something go
wrong in the automated process of delivery. If a good is out of stock or suffers
from some substantial defect, the consumer does not expect that the retailer
will necessarily correct delivery. If a service becomes burdensome for
whatever reason, the consumer realizes that the seller of those services may
choose not to complete the job as initially contemplated. Again, compensation
may be limited below legal defaults.
The low expectations created by widespread experience redeem these
retailers of goods and services. If retailers and consumers share an
understanding about the conditional nature of retail promises, a failure to
deliver is unlikely to constitute breach of those promises.
In unnegotiated contracts, shared expectations about what each party is
prepared to do merge with intentions regarding the scope of the parties’
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obligations. Expectations arise from multiple sources, but especially
prevailing market practices and legal defaults. Parties will look to the normal
operation of similarly-priced contracts to understand what their respective
rights and obligations will be. In addition, well-publicized default rules will
rarely contradict the intentions of contracting parties because the parties will
either accept them or explicitly reject them.
Discussion of whether we should construe commercial contracts as
deliver or pay contracts has sometimes appeared to turn on whether we should
interpret contractual obligation in a manner consistent with the moral
obligation that attends contractual promise. But a large part of the promissory
obligation generated by a given promise turns on the intention of promisor and
promisee. Prevailing practices in both the market and the law will significantly
determine parties’ intentions in standard form retail contracts. Thus, while law
and morality may or may not diverge on matters of excuse and on the
consequences of breach, the substantive core of moral obligation under any
retail promise—i.e., what the promisor is obligated to do—is likely to track
legal and market practice.32
In the first instance, the result is a convergence of contractual promise
around a few viable models. Consumers and retailers sign onto one of a few
different packages of terms that are readily available to them.  The33
transaction costs that drive this pooling are not primarily ones relating to the
limits of judicial interpretation.  It is not the law but the market that34
orchestrates convergence. In the commercial context, the costs of offering
unique terms and the cost of navigating an infinite number of retail
possibilities render most retail contracts more or less replicas of each other.
However, in sufficiently large markets, market forces do not usually push
toward a single equilibrium for any transaction type. There is more than one
kind of contract available for the purchase of any type of good or service.
32. Cf. Raz, supra note 1, at 933–34 (Contract law supports relevant promissory norms rather than
directing them. But because it is not perfectly but just predominantly supportive, it has a conservative force.
For example, it extends the practice, as in contractual promises between strangers.).
33. Cf. EMILIE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 161 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984)
(“Most of our relationships with others are of a contractual nature. If therefore we had each time to launch
ourselves afresh into these conflicts and negotiations necessary to establish clearly all the conditions of the
agreement, for the present and the future, our actions would be paralysed. . . . We can only depart from
[contract law] in part, and by chance.”); Kreitner, supra note 17, at 456 (“[C]ontract law will offer potential
contracting parties a series of set types of relations . . . .”).
34. Cf. Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1752–53 (1997) (“[T]he meaning of the contract is determined by the law, except
for matters in which the parties are allowed—under certain conditions and limitations—to deviate
therefrom, and to the extent they usually do so.”).
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Goods on the market may be segmented along lines of quality. But contracting
parties, at least on the consumer side, are segmented along socioeconomic
lines. In each pool of patterned retail promises, buyers and sellers understand
their mutual obligations similarly, but differently from those contracting on
some other pattern.
It is worth noting that my argument is not that the conventions that
dominate within a given contractual community are self-justifying because of
the conventional character of promise. In that case, one might resist deferring
to consumers and retailers’ understanding of their respective obligations by
denying the fully institutional character of promise and of contract. A
transcendental account of promise, in which the obligation to perform
promises is more than conventional, would seem conducive to a more
restrictive account of what follows from the apparent undertaking of
obligation irrespective of affirmative attempts—let alone passive
understandings—that purport to contain those normative consequences.  Even35
if promise is not a transcendental practice, the concept of obligation at least
transcends the practice of promising. How obligations attach to the words and
acts that we associate with promise may not correspond to how those
obligations are recognized by those within the practice.  However, my36
argument is not that the content of retail promising is self-justifying because
it is repetitive across numerous contracts. The patterned aspect of retail
promising is relevant here because it helps determine how any one contractual
pair will understand their particular obligations. It is the intention of the
parties to contract on either a deliver or pay, or simple delivery model that
determines which form of retail contracting they undertake.
C. The Parties’ Understanding as to the Form of Retail Promise Will
Systematically Vary
Not all consumers and retailers share a common expectation about
whether the retailer retains an option to compensate rather than deliver. Some
consumers expect delivery, and some retailers are prepared to commit to
delivery.
35. See, e.g., Michael H. Robins, The Primacy of Promising, 85 MIND 321 (1976).
36. See SCANLON, supra note 3, at 296 (arguing that the wrong in promise-breaking does not depend
on the social practice); Dolores Miller, Constitutive Rules and Essential Rules, 39 PHIL. STUD. 183, 188
(1981) (“Obligation is not an intra-institutional term—something defined or constituted by certain behavior
regulated by certain rules. Obligation is a concept or value which exists above and beyond promising—it
is logically independent of promising, although promising may not be logically independent of it.”).
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In some cases, there may be a mutual understanding that the custom-
ordered, heirloom-quality product will be delivered to exacting standards,
irrespective of how many initial errors the manufacturer makes; he may simply
be required, by that mutual understanding, to correct them, at whatever cost.
In other cases, a standard, competitively priced product may be purchased
with the understanding that if it fails to meet even commonly accepted
standards, it may be returned, but no additional effort to deliver the good as
initially presented would be intended by the retailer or expected by the
purchaser. In still other circumstances, a promise to provide services at low
cost may be accompanied by a mutual understanding that the service provider
will respond or accommodate complaint only if the service fails to meet a far
lower standard than either really expects the service to approach; thus, the
initial contractual promise is to deliver only to some minimum extent. Finally,
in some cases, a contractual promise to perform some service is highly
conditional—more conditional even than the terms on which that same service
might be provided by some other provider in the same economic community.
The variety of forms that commercial promise might take exists in both
the contexts of the moral and legal practice—that is because both the moral
and legal practice assign critical, albeit not dispositive, weight to the mutual
understanding of promisor and promisee. Whatever the outer limits on
promise as a moral practice, it is still sufficiently flexible to accommodate a
diverse range of promises with respect to any single substantive exchange.
Retailers who undertake more rigorous commitments are paid
accordingly, making it possible to remain competitive with lower cost retailers
who promise their goods or services more conditionally. Retailers whose
goods or services are of superior quality, or whose operations are more
streamlined or otherwise more efficient, will be able to offer more security
behind what they sell at lower cost than less competitive retailers. Thus, the
market will naturally separate into those who offer lower quality goods or
services with minimum commitment at a low price, and those who offer higher
quality goods and services accompanied by more stringent commitments to
their customers, but at a higher cost. Parties’ expectations will be shaped by
their knowledge of contracts at a similar price point. Thus, the mutual
expectations of the parties will differ systematically in high- and low-end
consumer markets. The result is separate contract communities with distinct
promissory norms.
Commercial promisors operating in high-end markets are more likely to
promise delivery of a specific good or service; promisors to low-end
consumers are more likely to promise either delivery or compensation.
Because it is commonly accepted that you “get what you pay for,” high-
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spending consumers will expect actual delivery, and will bring this
expectation to their understanding of the commercial promises they receive.
Low-spending consumers will understand that the promises they receive are
conditional in various ways, and will not expect full compensation when
delivery is not forthcoming.
Retailers will self-sort into high- and low-end markets based on their
relative cost structure. Of course, there is nothing inevitable about the pairing
of high-quality goods with more rigorous contractual commitments. That is to
say, a retailer could, in principle, sell services and goods that are of average
high quality, but not commit to each particular good or service sold meeting
that high standard. There is also nothing inevitable about the pairing of high-
quality service with other aspects of performance, such as punctuality or the
certainty of the service being provided (at whatever quality) as promised.
Similarly, one could offer goods or services that are of average low quality,
but commit contractually to that low standard, and to delivering the good or
service at whatever the average quality, come what may. However, what we
actually see is that higher end goods are usually accompanied by more
rigorous contractual commitments, while low-end good or services are also
accompanied by what I will characterize as low-quality promises. In these
low-quality promises, failure to provide even the low-quality good or service,
either at an ever lower standard or not at all, results in a refund or credit.
There is no commitment to replacement at no cost to the consumer, or to
delivery at all in the event of some shortage or other condition that makes
delivery of the good or service difficult or costly at a particular time.
Why do we see high-end products and services paired with high-quality
promises, and vice versa? In some markets, it is commercially advisable to
offer more than a promise to deliver or pay. In these markets, consumers are
willing and able to pay a premium for assurance that they will obtain the
desired good or service. Unsurprisingly, these are the consumers with higher
purchasing power who are also able and interested in purchasing more
expensive goods to begin with. These consumers are willing to pay to avoid
the inconvenience of having to find a substitute, or having to wait for delayed
delivery. In these markets, it is also advisable to specify a standard of
performance higher than that imposed as a legal default. Consumers in this
market are willing to pay for something approaching perfect tender.
Of course, not all consumers are so willing and able to pay. Markets that
cater to those who will not pay for the luxury of a more pointed promise will
be characterized by promises that are inferior in the sense that, all else (i.e.
price) being equal, everyone would prefer these promises to the more
conditional promises that are normal in all but the most expensive markets.
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Delivery of a good or service in a more conditional contract depends on
circumstances aligning such that delivery is not unexpectedly burdensome for
the retailer-promisor; in particular, whether delivery occurs in a “deliver or
pay” contract depends on whether delivery is cheaper than paying. These
conditional promises should be regarded as inferior because the value of a
promise to the promisee usually lies in the solidity of the commitment
undertaken, and the outcome of a bifurcated promise like other conditional
promises, is generally less certain.
The result of this heterogeneity is the co-existence of separate
communities for retail promise. We are familiar with the idea that contracts
must be interpreted in light of the particular communities out of which they
arise: Courts regularly defer to trade usage and contractual communities are
usually delineated by trade and profession. Courts are interested in trade usage
and the ways in which parties normally employ certain terms because they
indicate how parties to any given contract intended to use those terms.
Because social context is relevant to deciphering contractual intent, it helps
supply the content of contractual promises. But trade and profession are not
always the most relevant markers of social context. Other dimensions of status
are important for delineating the appropriate boundaries of a contractual
community.
Because the legally enforceable terms of the contracts in which retail
promises are embedded may not systematically differ, the divisions between
those who make and receive highly conditional promises, and those who make
and receive more pointed promises, is relatively unfamiliar to contract law.
However, as a general matter, the relevant status boundary is quite familiar.
Those who have the means are able to obtain more certainty and are entitled
to make more burdensome claims on their contractual partners in the
marketplace. Others must make do with promises that deliver less
predictability, and because they bear a greater share of the burden when
negative contingencies arise, they generate fewer reasons for their contractual
partners to deviate from their normal course of conduct.
II. QUALITY OF PROMISE
My claim is not only that promises are different in distinct socioeconomic
communities, but also that some are better than others. One might resist the
idea that promises vary in their quality. One might argue that a promise is a
promise, and that while the content of some promises may be more valuable
that others, the promises themselves are formally equivalent, and the notion
of quality simply does not apply to promises. But we are better off
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understanding promises to vary in quality. One might treat the concept of a
promise like the concept of a square, such that anything that formally meets
the requisite properties is a square (or a promise). But we would do better to
regard the concept of promise like the concept of water. There is a sense in
2which something is water or it is not—either it is H O or it is not. But once we
think of the purposes for which water is normally used, notably for drinking,
it is natural to think of water varying in quality. We all regard water that is
more pure, with fewer contaminants or foreign particles as superior water.
For those who reject the idea that there is exists even a natural concept of
promise, a better analogy might be to animal taxonomy. There is, of course,
a sense in which an animal either is a cat or is not a cat. But some cats are
more cat-like—or some cats of a particular breed better exemplify the traits
of that breed—and in this sense, one can say they are better examples of a cat,
or better examples of that breed. It may seem peculiar to engage in this kind
of normative ranking with respect to cats, but that is because cats do not serve
a function as such, and therefore it is generally of no consequence whether a
cat is more or less cat-like. But if one thinks of taxonomy in a context where
the object in question does serve a function, we can further push the idea of
normatively-driven notions of quality. For example, while a vegetable is
perhaps either a leafy green vegetable or not, if we are interested in whether
a vegetable is leafy green because of its nutritional properties, we might deem
a certain leafy green a better leafy green vegetable than another. In this case,
we would not just be remarking that the vegetable is better generally (indeed,
it may be inferior in some respects), but specifically noting that the property
most relevant to its classification as a leafy green is relatively lacking.
All of these examples go to show that while many concepts, including
promises, may be conceived of as either/or concepts where the concept is
normatively motivated, or where the object is at least associated with some
particular function, it is possible and actually useful to speak of inferior and
superior species of that concept. Thus, we can sensibly speak of superior
promises as ones that better serve the ethical function of promises, or that
better demonstrate the ethical value that we associate with promises. Inferior
promises, by contrast, are less valuable because they do not serve that
function, and are relatively lacking in that quality which we associate with the
practice of promise.
What is the ethical function or value of promise? Most writings on
promise emphasize certain related dimensions of the practice such that, for the
most part, we need not choose between them in order to distinguish the
superior from the inferior variety. Some scholars emphasize that the value of
promising lies in planning. The certainty that promises provide with respect
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to at least some future events, namely the conduct of the promisor, is valuable
to promisees as they make minor and major decisions about how to live their
lives in the interim.  Other authors emphasize the relational value of the37
practice. In one view, by promising we delegate authority over our future
conduct to another.  In still another view, by promising we bind ourselves to38
involvement with the other so long as the promise is outstanding; the act
anticipates and perhaps forces a degree of cooperation and deference that
might not otherwise evolve.  In my view, we commit to giving the other’s39
interests a certain weight in our future decision-making.40
It is not necessarily the case that the relevant value of promise is constant
across different domains in our lives. Promises made in a private context
likely have a different value to us than promises in a commercial context.
While there must be some constancy that justifies our inclusion of both types
of promises under an umbrella practice of promise, this commonality does not
require us to collapse private and commercial promise and their distinct
ethical functions and values. Even if the various values and functions of
promise noted above are present in most kinds of promise, they may be
present to different degrees in different contexts. For example, the relational
values of promising may be more important in the private sphere. The
opportunity for planning and associated sense of entitlement to which promise
gives rise is more important in promise among strangers, as in the commercial
retail context.
Once we have established the value of promise within a given domain, we
can then further characterize specific promises of that type as demonstrating
that value to a higher or lower degree. That is, we can say that a commercial
promise is superior in the sense that it fulfills especially well, the ethical
function that we associate with commercial promise. This would not indicate
anything one way or the other as to how this promise would fare by the
standards we should apply in another domain, as in the context of promises
between friends. But it means that, so long as every promise belongs to some
domain with respect to which we can identify the domain-specific value of
promise, we can speak of the quality of any given promise.
Promises thus vary in their quality, and in particular, commercial
promises in consumer markets vary systematically in quality. Not just
37. See David Owens, A Simple Theory of Promising, 115 PHIL. REV. 51, 51 n.1 (2006) (labeling
these views as “information-interest theories”).
38. Id.
39. Markovits, supra note 1.
40. Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise, 38 FLA. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
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promisors, but also promisees in low-end consumer markets understand the
promises that they normally give and receive on the market to be of an inferior
variety because of their past experiences in the market and general knowledge
of its operation. As argued above, their mutual understanding as to the content
of these promises is largely determinative of the content of their promises.
Their shallow content, namely their failure to generate predictability and to
secure a sense of entitlement in those consumers vis-à-vis the retailers with
whom they transact, renders those promises inferior to those of high-end
counterparts.
One might dispute that these promises have the content I suggest above;
they may be as solid as other promises, and capable of generating the same
predictability and entitlement as do their high-end counterparts. What I regard
as a mutual understanding regarding their inferior content might be
characterized instead as a mutual understanding as to the probability of
performance. In that case, one could argue, the promises are not inferior per
se, they are just not believed in or trusted.
However, we cannot dismiss promisees’ understanding that promisors
commit only to deliver or compensate (to some limited extent) as mere
disbelief that the promisors will perform their promises. If promisees took
contractual promises to be “lying promises,” they would fail as promises.
Lying promises are not real promises because the promisor does not
successfully bind himself to the promisee. The promisor may be obligated by
virtue of the commitment he purports to assume, but that obligation is not
promissory unless the promisee accepts that commitment and is prepared to
recognize and rely upon it. One cannot unilaterally engage in the practice of
promising any more than one can “communicate” with oneself. The value to
the promisor of promising lies in the capacity to change one’s normative
world, i.e. one’s normative relations with others, by virtue of one’s voluntary
communication.  That aspect is not merely diminished, but simply absent in41
a lying promise. The various values of a promise to the promisee, as discussed
above, all also turn on the promise meeting some threshold level of credibility.
Thus, if low-end retailers promise their consumers perfect tender but the
consumers do not believe it, we can say that they have only attempted to make
that promise.
We have still another reason to reject these so-called lying promises as
instances of promise. Promises are intentional acts. The intentionality refers
41. See Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210, 227–28 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977).
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not just to the expression of the intention to perform, but also the intention to
assume the promised obligation. In a lying promise, by definition, the
promisor does not so intend. Therefore, as a conceptual matter, it is again
incongruous to regard these types of insincere communications as promises
at all. If promises by low-end retailers have the same conditions with respect
to delivery that are common in high-end consumer markets, but both low-end
retailers and consumers understand at the outset that those promises will not
be kept, then these would-be promises are not promises at all.
Surely, promisors in low-end markets understand their retail contracts to
be some kind of promissory undertaking, and promisees take the commitments
they receive in exchange for their own commitments to pay as promissory in
nature. Certainly, the law regards these transactions as legally-binding
contracts, and as such, takes them to be successful as promises of a particular
kind and content. Thus, it is inconsistent with the self-understanding of the
parties as well as the existing legal framework to dismiss these transactions
as nonpromissory.
We would do better to understand them as promises without
reconstructing the notion of promise and without revisiting its essential
features. We need only allow for variety in the quality of promise. It is more
productive to regard them as promises and compare them as such, with what
are also promises of a similar type, but superior quality in high-end consumer
markets.
The fact that low-income persons are likely to be on the receiving end of
inferior promises is not surprising, since one would expect the quality of most
things purchased on the market to vary with price. But note that the contrast
between the consumer experiences of high-end and low-end purchasers of
retail goods and services is not reducible to a difference in the quality of the
actual goods and services they purchase. A few illustrative examples are in
order.
Consider two sofas for sale, one at Low-End Retailer and one at High-
End Retailer. The first sofa, at Low-End Retailer, is less plush, less soft, and
less durable than that sold at High-End Retailer. These contrasts pertain to the
product sold—they do not reflect on the quality of the promise to deliver the
sofa that each retailer sells. But Low-End Retailer also has a number of store
policies relevant to the purchase of its sofa. Should the sofa fail to be
delivered at the arranged time, the customer can reschedule, but cannot expect
any priority in scheduling. Should the sofa that arrives appear slightly
damaged in some way, but not substantially so—rendering it inferior to the
store model but not unusable—the store may offer replacement only at the
customer’s own cost. And should the store simply run out of these sofas prior
2011] UNEQUAL PROMISES 489
to the time of delivery, the customer can only expect to have her money
back—Low-End Retailer will not order a new sofa from the manufacturer.
These aspects of the purchase reflect on the quality of Low-End Retailer’s
promise.
Similarly, consider two plumbers. Local Plumber is self-employed and
charges substantially less than Plumbing Inc., which is a reputable company
operating over a large metropolitan area. Local Plumber charges less to have
a drain unclogged than does Plumbing Inc. Local Plumber is also a worse
plumber than any of the plumbers employed by Plumbing Inc. When Local
Plumber unclogs the drain, she does a less thorough job, resulting in another
clog within a short period of time. Local Plumber also tracks dirt into the
bathroom and leaves the bathtub dirty; the plumbers dispatched by Plumbing
Inc. know not to do either of those things. These differences pertain to the
quality of the service sold and not to the contracts governing those sales.
But Local Plumber is also less reliable in other ways that do relate to the
quality of her promise to fix the drain. Local Plumber frequently cancels
appointments as other more lucrative jobs come up. Even if she does show up,
the quality of Local Plumber’s work varies considerably, depending on
whether she must rush to another job. By contrast, Plumbing Inc. never
cancels and its plumbers have a strict checklist that they must go through with
each job. Moreover, Plumbing Inc. guarantees their work for a minimum
number of days, irrespective of whether a new clog is traceable to any
shoddiness in their plumbers’ work. These differences between the retailers
pertain to the quality of their respective promises to consumers of their
services. Analytically, it is possible to locate the difference elsewhere, but if
the salient resulting differences are in certainty and entitlement values
associated with promise, it is most illuminating to characterize this variety of
retail promise as an inequality in the quality of promise that prevails in distinct
markets.
III. RELEVANCE OF UNEQUAL PROMISE: UNEQUAL CONTROL,
UNEQUAL ENTITLEMENT
Why separate out differences in the quality of promise from differences
in the quality of the actual goods or services sold? This is a relevant exercise
because many goods and services do not have a special ethical value. To be
sure, the fact that some people can purchase more and better things is of moral
interest, but there is no moral problem with disparity in the items people
possess in itself. Even in a society characterized by social justice, we would
expect people to spend their resources differently, and thus we would observe
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discrepancies in the quality of the consumer goods and services they purchase.
Promises, however, may play a special role in our society. Private promises
play a special role in our private relationships. Similarly, commercial promises
play a distinct but important role in how we relate to others in our political
and economic community.
While many goods and services are not of inherent ethical import, some
are. We can borrow from the debates regarding the moral acceptability of
inequality in those goods and services to better understand the moral import
of unequal consumer promises. The question in the context of critical goods
and services that are deemed, within a given community, as essential to the
pursuit of a good life, is whether contract or consumer law should homogenize
the market (to some extent) through mandatory legal rules. We can and should
ask this of commercial promise just as we can ask this of other things bought
and sold on the market. With healthcare, most people believe that we should
limit the inequality that results from operation of the market. With jewelry,
few people feel that way. Are promises more like healthcare or jewelry?
In answering that question, we should bear in mind the underlying
question: whether contract (or consumer) law should be used to make uniform
the market for promises. Is the impoverished quality of promise that is
available to many, if not most, consumers morally unattractive? We can ask
this of commercial promise just as we can ask this of other things bought and
sold on the market. With healthcare, many people believe we should limit the
inequality that results from operation of the market. With jewelry, few people
feel that way. I would argue that in some respects, at least, promises are more
like healthcare than jewelry.
It is worth noting that the concern I raise here is not with the very
conditional nature of certain retail promises, or even the prevalence of such
conditional promises, but rather the difference in the nature of promise that
individuals within a single political community typically experience with
strangers. One might object to the absolute quality of retail promises in certain
consumer markets in the same way one might deplore the poor standard of
healthcare available in certain communities. The difficulty common to both
of these complaints is identifying an absolute standard of acceptability. The
cost of higher mandatory standards in healthcare competes with the cost of
providing other valuable—and incommensurable—goods and services. While
we might be tempted to conclude that we know an unacceptable level of care
when we see it, this approach offers little guidance for policymakers. Nor is
it helpful to observe that, in all likelihood, even if we strive to achieve the
highest standard politically possible, we are unlikely to reach the morally
acceptable minimum, making the identification of that minimum unnecessary.
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Concerns regarding levels of healthcare are difficult to translate into
viable policy programs. Similarly, concerns regarding the appropriate level of
conditionality, or conversely, the ethically desirable level of security present
in retail promise, do not translate readily into a concrete program of consumer
protection. At some point, one might conclude that a retail promise is actually
illusory, and therefore, should be disallowed in contexts where both parties
appear to intend to contract. One might also speculate about the kinds of
promise that most consumers would accept with a full understanding of their
terms. But in light of the income disparity that drives unequal retail promise,
it is likely that even correcting for these extremes, which may reflect potential
defects in contractual process, there will remain considerable disparity in the
kinds of promises that low- and high-income consumers normally experience
in the marketplace.
The unique concerns raised by the disparity in the quality of retail
promise stem from the special ethical value to individuals of their
participation in the practice of commercial promise. Commercial promise
plays an important role in a political community and that role is undermined
by the market phenomenon of unequal promise. One possibility is that its
value lies in its cultivation of trust between contracting parties. If its value lies
in the promotion of trust, the practice may be undermined by the prevalence
of conditional promises regardless of the distribution of that conditionality. If
we expect and desire even commercial promise to help cement trust in a
political community, then we might be concerned that the prevalence of an
impoverished form of promise would prevent the practice of promise from
fulfilling that function.
But trust is probably not the most important thing to come out of our
commercial experiences with strangers. Commercial transactions will not
consistently lead individuals to trust the particular persons with whom they
engage, especially because so many of our commercial dealings are with
corporate or otherwise anonymous entities. Given the numerous layers of legal
and social norms, as well as economic pressures, that constrain commercial
behavior, we are also unlikely to attribute good behavior in the marketplace
to personal qualities in those with whom we transact.42
42. It may be that promise-breaking is wrong at least in part for reasons that have to do with abuse
of trust. For example, promising followed by promise-breaking may constitute misleading conduct that is
wrong for non-institutional reasons similar to those that make straightforward misrepresentation wrong. See
SCANLON, supra note 3, at 298. This is not inconsistent with the idea that the value of the practice of
promise, at least from the standpoint of law and policy, is its value to the promisee—whether the general
value of assurance, or what I describe here as its marginal contribution to a promisee’s sense of control over
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The value of commercial promise lies elsewhere. It has more to do with
empowerment. It is the unequal sense of control and entitlement reinforced by
unequal promise that should be most disconcerting. Promise generates a sense
of control in promisees by virtue of mitigating the uncertainties that we must
otherwise navigate as we plan for the future. Most retail promises will affect
future plans in only small ways. But the debilitating effect of uncertainty in
individual contracts is cumulative. Every contractual promise that results in
something other than delivery, where the inferior promise was purchased due
to financial constraints, reinforces one’s sense that one has little control over
the series of small events that comprises each day.
Commercial promise generates another value that is lacking in promises
to deliver or pay. Individual consumers are largely passive in the marketplace.
Together, their level of demand sets prices, but as individuals, they take prices
without negotiation. Together, their preferences determine the range and
quality of products; individually, they must choose among the available
options. The basic features of a retail contract are not responsive to the needs
and wishes of individual consumers. However, those retail contracts that do
promise delivery create the possibility that the retailer will have to be
responsive to the circumstances of an individual consumer in order to fulfill
her obligations. The promisor might have to do something that she otherwise
would not or something that she was not already going to do, such as
manufacture or sell the product. Whether it is repairing an item or adjusting
one’s schedule to ensure the service is complete, the retail promisee in these
cases is in the position of making demands on someone with concrete,
immediate consequences for how that promisor allocates his time and effort.
Where the retail promise carries no such commitment, it is the consumer-
promisee who must adjust her allocation of time and effort to the reality that
performance of the contract will not take the form of delivery.43
Those who regularly experience high-quality promises from strangers,
develop a set of expectations regarding how others will behave toward them
even outside the context of retail contracting. These expectations are likely to
be met because if others are obligated to treat them respectfully and
predictably in contract, they are likely to continue this pattern of behavior
even when it is not mandatory; after all, often such conduct is not especially
her relations with others, and ultimately, over her own life.
43. Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 1564 (“When the plumber opts not to show . . . she has still made
a decision for you about how your time, attention, and labor must be devoted. One might exaggerate the
point by saying she has made you an involuntary employee of hers. She has usurped your ability to make
independent, voluntary decisions about the use and form of your time, attention, and labor.”).
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costly, and it is in any case usually a matter of habit. Individuals’ expectations
regarding how others are to interact with them and others’ habits with respect
to how to treat such individuals, are mutually self-reinforcing in a virtuous
circle. By contrast, those who have little expectations regarding the reliability
of others’ conduct will interact with others as if their conduct is unpredictable
and often oriented against one’s own interests. And they will be right, because
it is so often evident from the kind of retail experience a person usually has,
that others will conform to her low expectations, even where cost or
contractual obligation is not at issue.
Broadly speaking, the value of commercial promise lies in its
empowerment of consumers who value their ability to navigate the retail
world and exercise their choice and discretion. Commercial promise is also
valuable because it cultivates a sense of responsibility toward those to whom
one has assumed contractual obligations. In light of these essential values,
unequal promise reinforces a class-based sense of entitlement, both
experienced and perceived.
The disparity in the sense of entitlement that results from these diverging
experiences in the consumer marketplace is problematic because it affects not
just any of the primary goods utilized by individuals in their pursuit of the
good life, but one of the most fundamental of the primary goods: individuals’
sense of self. It is of greater concern than disparities in other resources that
might be useful in the pursuit of one’s conception of the good because sense
of self motivates the formation of such a conception.
Moreover, because politics in a large political community are anonymous
in much the same way that retail transactions are in a large economy, a
differential sense of entitlement among different classes is likely to spill over
into distinct expectations toward one’s government. Because expectations of
government are critical to motivating a type of public discourse that values
democratic accountability, reinforcing and weakening expectations of
strangers in different classes fuels political inequality.
Notwithstanding this potentially malignant heterogeneity in the
conditionality of retail promise, it may be futile, or at least ill-advised, to
attempt to avoid it by making commercial promise more uniform. We might
attempt to address this by more vigorously enforcing commercial promises
made in that large segment of the consumer market that caters to a wide range
of consumers. In this way, high-quality promises will at least become a regular
part of low-income consumers’ experience of the market. However, our ability
to remedy this dynamic with contract rules is ultimately quite limited. The
phenomenon of unequal retail promise may instead offer just another ground
for complaint against gross inequality of wealth and income.
